

# Managing Sovereign Debt Sustainability Risks

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- Undoing Quantitative Easing → Quantitative Tightening

Chart		Set as Default View		Economic Forecasts						
Country/Region/World		Contributor		Contributor Composite						
United States		Browse		Private			Official			
		Actual/ Forecasts				Probability of Recession				15.0%
Indicator	Q4 17	Q1 18	Q2 18	Q3 18	Q4 18	Q1 19	Q2 19	Q3 19	Q4 19	Q1 20
<b>External Balance</b>										
Curr. Acct. (% of GDP)	-2.3	-2.3	-2.2	-2.3	-2.4	-2.5	-2.5	-2.5	-2.6	-2.6
<b>Financial Balances</b>										
Budget (% of GDP)	-3.4	-3.7	-3.7	-3.8	-4.4	-4.7	-4.4	-4.7	-4.9	-5.0
Government Debt (% of GD..)			76.9	77.1	77.2	77.7	77.7	78.3	79.3	79.9
<b>Interest Rates</b>										
Central Bank Rate (%)	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.50	2.70	2.90	3.05	3.10	3.05
3-Month Rate (%)	1.69	2.31	2.34	2.40	2.61	2.79	2.96	3.10	3.17	3.24
2-Year Note (%)	1.89	2.27	2.53	2.82	2.89	3.02	3.13	3.21	3.26	3.31
10-Year Note (%)	2.41	2.74	2.86	3.06	3.17	3.26	3.33	3.36	3.41	3.44
<b>Exchange Rates</b>										
EURUSD	1.20	1.23	1.17	1.16	1.15	1.18	1.20	1.22	1.25	

- Time of changes: political, technological
  - Bouts of volatility while learning takes place

- Incomplete contracts
- Written as non-contingent but contingent in practice
  - Debt payment capacity is stochastic
- No multinational legal system for resolving sovereign debt distress

- The standard anatomy:
  - Change in market expectations
  - Increase in the cost of debt rollover
  - Fiscal austerity and new loans (possible from official creditors) to meet larger debt payments
  - Lower economic growth, lower fiscal revenues, more debt distress

- **A note on the evidence:**

- Alesina-Ardagna 2009, “Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus Spending”, analyzed 107 experiences of fiscal austerity and singled out 22 *successful* cases
- Jayadev-Konczal 2010, “The Boom not the Slump: The Right Time for Austerity”, analyzed how many of those
  - ① happened in a recession
  - ② were followed by a recovery of economic growth
  - ③ were followed by a fall in debt/GDP
- The answer: only one case, Ireland 1987
  - Ireland’s main trade partner was experiencing a boom at that time

- Eventually, there is a debt restructuring
  - “Too late”, and often delivers “too little” relief

1970-2013: fraction of sovereign debt restructurings with private creditors followed by another restructuring or default with private creditors within  $t$  years


$t$	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Fraction</b>	0.497	0.525	0.553	0.575	0.6



1970-2013: fraction of sovereign debt restructurings with private creditors followed by another restructuring or default within  $t$  years

$t$	3	4	5	6	7
<b>High Income</b>	0.619	0.650	0.700	0.700	0.700
<b>Upper Middle Income</b>	0.500	0.548	0.578	0.590	0.622
<b>Lower Middle Income</b>	0.467	0.477	0.500	0.523	0.548
<b>Low Income</b>	0.455	0.455	0.469	0.531	0.548
<b>Total</b>	0.497	0.525	0.553	0.575	0.6

- Finalization of a restructuring process can take too long due to holdout/vulture funds behavior



- Deficient international financial architecture
- Domestic legislation
  - Punitive “compensatory interest rate” for missed payments (9% under NY law)
  - Legislation that favors vulture funds’ business

- Domestic policies
  - International capital flows management
  - Choice of jurisdictions for debt issuance
- Larger-scale adoption of contingent debt (GDP growth bonds)
  - Important work from the Bank of England, Bank of Canada, Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Need for a multinational system for sovereign debt restructuring based on sound principles

- UN GA Resolution 69/319 (Sept 2015) adopted nine principles for sovereign debt restructuring:
  - ① Sovereignty
  - ② Good faith
  - ③ Transparency
  - ④ Impartiality
  - ⑤ Equitable treatment of creditors
  - ⑥ Sovereign immunity
  - ⑦ Legitimacy
  - ⑧ Sustainability
  - ⑨ (Super-)Majority restructuring

- Principles-based sovereign debt sustainability
  - Principles for sovereign debt restructuring impose additional constraints for defining debt sustainability

- Deficient outcomes in the practice for sovereign debt restructuring
- Mounting risks
- Substantial room for improvement
  - Reforms to the international financial architecture
  - Better contracts
  - Management of international capital flows
  - Different approaches for assessing sovereign debt sustainability (principles-based)